Defining Roles and Responsibilities for the Effective Coordination of Social Safety Net Programmes

Team “Fabulous”
Social Safety Nets Core Course
8-19th December 2014
Washington, D.C.
Team Members

Bandiyiminsi Ferdinand
Aleksandar Lazovski
Thandie Maziya
Japhet Ndoricimpa
Maki Noda
Cindy Paladines
Solene Rougeaux
Angele Loko Togbe
James Tumwine
Question: Why do we need to have a coordination mechanism for SSNs?

1. To avoid duplication.
2. To maximize the use of limited resources.
3. To increase partnerships.
4. All of the above.
5. We do not need any coordination mechanism – waste of time.
Defining **Coordination**

**Coordination** is:

- the act of organizing, making different people or things work together for a goal or effect to fulfill the desired goals in an organization.

- a managerial function in which different activities of the business are properly adjusted and interlinked.

*(Source: wikipedia)*
Coordination at the central level is usually organized through the development and adoption of *Memorandums of Understanding (MoU)*.

- Technical staff from concerned Ministries develop the text of the MoU and then these are approved/signed by the Ministers.
  - MoUs are usually adopted/amended once a need for them occurs.
  - MoUs are *not legally binding documents*, so, it’s up to the parties to implement them.

- The *Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs* initiates the development and adoption of MoUs with other Ministries.

### What do MoUs contain?
- Name & contact details of focal points
- A clear and concise outline of rules and responsibilities
- A protocol for the exchange of information

### Examples:
- MoUs on the exchange of information between the Ministry of Social Affairs and various civil registries (i.e. land and property cadaster, birth registry, etc.)
When Coordination Fails: MACEDONIA

- Coordination between local and central level authorities is not functional.
- Municipalities have the legal authority to develop and administer Social Protection, but they choose not to do it.
- Municipalities have no incentives to spend a portion of their local budgets on social protection programmes.
- Municipalities feel that social protection is the exclusive domain of central government.

The municipalities want...
- regular transfers (block donations or earmarked funds) from the central government
- staff paid by the central government
- to focus on infrastructural projects only.

The central government wants...
- the municipalities to become active stakeholders in the design and delivery of social protection
- dedicate a portion of their budget on social protection as an add-on to what is already provided
Success: Good collaboration of actors
Why?: The right persons participated

- Joint design of data collection tool → formation of multi sectorial / multi actors committee
- The committee was formed on a need-based/ad-hoc basis
- Incentives to participate were clarified - members knew what benefit they would gain from the process
- Members knew what contributions were expected from them
- Limits: task-based, short time span
When Co ordination Fails: CCTs IN SENEGAL

- Coordination with ministry of education to define how to monitor conditionalities
- Difficulties: Monitoring conditionalities does not happen
- Reasons:
  - No agreement at political level (between agency and ministry of education)
  - Technicians can’t continue the discussions without support from higher leadership
When Coordination Fails: REGIONAL LEVEL COORDINATION IN SENEGAL

- Multi actor committees at the regional level
- Objective: oversee the targeting mechanism at local level

Reasons:
- Financial incentives not result based
- Objectives not well defined – too vague
- No clear roles and responsibilities
# Analytical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (experience)</th>
<th>Specific goal/objective</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Legislative framework/MoU (TOR?)</th>
<th>Capacity in coordination</th>
<th>Membership/Right people</th>
<th>Roles and Responsibility</th>
<th>Incentives (motivation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (Central SP Cord.)</td>
<td>Yes (effective SP)</td>
<td>Yes (Minister of MOSL)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (strong)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (implicit)</td>
<td>Yes (implicit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (Local – Central Cord)</td>
<td>Yes (localized SP)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (limited)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Medium (No TOR)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal &amp; Haiti (Data collection Cord.)</td>
<td>Yes (single targeting tool)</td>
<td>Yes (DG of MAST (H) &amp; No (need base)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (unified tool)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (Regional Cord)</td>
<td>Yes (Validations )</td>
<td>Yes (Governor)</td>
<td>Yes (Act)</td>
<td>No (limited)</td>
<td>No (too large)</td>
<td>No (TOR exists but not clear)</td>
<td>Yes (money)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (Central – local govt)</td>
<td>Yes (In-kinds transfer)</td>
<td>Yes Minister of MOSA but weak</td>
<td>Yes (TOR)</td>
<td>No (limited)</td>
<td>Yes (multi govt)</td>
<td>Yes (TOR exists but not clear)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda (MINALOC)</td>
<td>Yes (Promote SP)</td>
<td>Yes (Minister of MoSA)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (limited)</td>
<td>Yes (multi &amp; donor)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (Performance Contract)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland (Central)</td>
<td>Yes (SP scale up)</td>
<td>Yes (Deputy PM)</td>
<td>Yes (MoU)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (in process)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brundi (Commune Cord. - food distribution)</td>
<td>Yes (Targeting &amp;accountability)</td>
<td>Yes (Mayor)</td>
<td>No (mayor s decision)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (multi)</td>
<td>Yes (verbal agreement)</td>
<td>Not well defined/ Understood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin (Commune Cord)</td>
<td>Yes (avoid duplication)</td>
<td>Yes (Mayor)</td>
<td>No (mayor s decision)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (multi &amp; NGOs)</td>
<td>Yes (TOR)</td>
<td>Yes (coverage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (CIDH)</td>
<td>Yes (fight against poverty)</td>
<td>Yes (delegated Ministry)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (limited)</td>
<td>Yes (multi govt)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not well understood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Lessons

- Identifying shared and specific goals can serve good incentives (motivations)
- Membership and precise roles should be clearly stated in the TOR
- Membership should be limited to key representatives (decision makers/continuity/accountable to the decisions)
- Having legislative framework does not necessarily make coordination mechanism but for a long term, legislative framework is needed.
- Capacity in coordination is key (requires specific skills in facilitation and understanding coordination)

Opportunities

- Opportunity to include beneficiaries’ voice
- Coordination can be effectively used for monitoring of conditionality of SSNs